World Maritime University

The Maritime Commons: Digital Repository of the World Maritime
University
World Maritime University Dissertations

Dissertations

10-31-2021

A study on the vulnerability of Korean shipping companies to
cybersecurity threats
Sungjae Kim

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.wmu.se/all_dissertations
Part of the Transportation Commons

Recommended Citation
Kim, Sungjae, "A study on the vulnerability of Korean shipping companies to cybersecurity threats" (2021).
World Maritime University Dissertations. 1711.
https://commons.wmu.se/all_dissertations/1711

This Dissertation is brought to you courtesy of Maritime Commons. Open Access items may be downloaded for
non-commercial, fair use academic purposes. No items may be hosted on another server or web site without
express written permission from the World Maritime University. For more information, please contact
library@wmu.se.

WORLD MARITIME UNIVERSITY
Malmö, Sweden

A STUDY ON THE VULNERABILITY OF
KOREAN SHIPPING COMPANIES TO
CYBERSECURITY THREATS
By
SUNG-JAE KIM
Republic of Korea

A dissertation submitted to the World Maritime University in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the reward of the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE
in
MARITIME AFFARS
(MARITIME SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATION)

2021

Copyright KIM, SUNG-JAE, 2021

1

Declaration
I certify that all the material in this dissertation that is not my own work has been
identified, and that no material is included for which a degree has previously been
conferred on me.

The contents of this dissertation reflect my own personal views, and are not necessarily
endorsed by the University.

(Signature): ....................................................

(Date): ............................................................

Supervised by: Professor Raphael Baumler
World Maritime University
Supervisor’s affiliation: Maritime Safety and Environmental Administration

2

Acknowledgements
First of all, I would like to thank the Government of the Republic of Korea
for providing me an opportunity to increase knowledge and expand
experience in the maritime field at the World Maritime University (WMU)
in Malmö, Sweden. And I also express my sincere gratitude to Professor
Raphael Baumler, who provided important advice and guidance in writing
my dissertation successfully, and Mrs. Rebecca Sheehan, who has always
helped me with kindness and careful consideration. Also, I would like to
thank the WMU staff and faculty members for their various help and
supports during my study at WMU.

I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to the staff members of
the shipping companies, Korean Register, and the Korea Ship Managers
Association for their willingness to participate in the dissertation survey
despite their busy work.

And I would like to present my sincere thankfulness to my mother, fatherin-law, and mother-in-law, who always gave me faith and love while
worrying about my first foreign life.

Lastly, I would like to express my sincere love and gratitude to my wife
Yoo Hee-young, who did not hesitate to give her own sacrifice and love
to support my graduate school studies and to take care our lovely children,
Kim Doo-hyun and Chae-young in a foreign country where COVID-19 is
prevalent.

3

Abstract
Title of Dissertation:

A Study on the Vulnerability of Korean shipping
companies to Cybersecurity Threats

Degree:

Master of Science

This dissertation is intended to evaluate the cybersecurity vulnerabilities of
shipping companies and analyze their causes. In addition, based on the analysis
results, this dissertation drew some recommendations on the policy direction for
strengthening the cybersecurity of the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) and member states.
Korean shipping companies were relatively well implementing 27 major
cybersecurity elements derived from cybersecurity guidelines such as BIMCO
and ISO/IEC. However, it was found that the group of small shipping companies
was more vulnerable than the group of large shipping companies due to the wide
variation of each company.
By analyzing the correlation between the company's cybersecurity
vulnerabilities and various characteristics of the company, it was found that the
company's cybersecurity capabilities, such as the company's organization and
human resources, employee expertise, education, and training about
cybersecurity, had the most remarkable correlation.
As a result of this analysis, it was suggested that IMO or member countries
clarify the targets of policies related to cybersecurity, concisely and clearly
present cybersecurity elements that companies should comply with, and
consider cybersecurity from the time of designing ships.

KEYWORDS: cybersecurity, cybersecurity threat, cybercrime, cybersecurity
elements, cybersecurity manager, shipping company, vulnerability, risk, risk
assessment, correlation, Pearson correlation coefficient, coefficient of
determination
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Introduction
1.1. Background
The impact of cybercrime on the global economy continues to increase due to the
universalization of the Internet and smartphones, the strengthening of IT devices’
connectivity by Cloud services and IoT devices. Cybersecurity firm McAfee and
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) reported global cybercrime costs
up to $600bn in 2017, which increased up to 34% from $445bn in 2014 (as cited by
Warwick, 2018).

Despite the rapid issue of cybercrime on land, the shipping industry has been a
relatively safe zone for cybercrime over the past few decades due to the
characteristics of ships separated from land networks. However, Cyberattacks on
major global shipping companies such as COSCO and MSC have been taking place
for four consecutive years since the NotPetya ransomware attack on Maersk in 2017
(Park, 2020). In addition, direct attacks on ships are increasing, with hackers taking
control of a German container ship in 2017 and several Korean car carrier ships’
computers being infected with ransomware in 2019 (Kim & Kim, 2019).

IMO adopted a resolution (MSC.428(98)) for the Maritime Cyber Risk Management in
Safety Management System (SMS) in 2017 to respond to the rapidly changing
cybersecurity environment in the maritime sector, which was implemented worldwide
on 1 January 2021. Accordingly, the shipping companies shall establish cyber risk
management measures in the company’s SMS, and the flag states shall verify its
adequacy in the company’s SMS review, which is conducted for the first audit since
1 January 2021.

BIMCO, Intertanko, and Classification Societies, etc. have developed and provided
Cyber risk management guidelines to support establishing the company’s security
management system. However, the contents of the guidelines are so vast and
professional that it is difficult for ordinary shipping company employees to understand
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and apply them to company’s management system. In particular, small shipping
companies that own one or two ships and do not receive consultation from external
professional cybersecurity companies are more challenging to understand and apply
the guidelines. In addition, it is necessary to understand the types and characteristics
of various cyberattacks and to identify and reinforce the vulnerabilities of cyber risk
management system of each company, but simply applying the security guidelines
makes it difficult to improve vulnerabilities considering the characteristics of
cyberattacks.

From this point of view, this paper will identify significant cybersecurity elements in
the cybersecurity guidelines using previous studies and analyses the security
vulnerabilities of shipping companies for identified individual items or cybersecurity
fields. It also investigates the relationship between the company’s characteristics ( as
the size of operation ships, cybersecurity personnel, etc.) between its cybersecurity
vulnerabilities to determine what shipping companies should focus on most to improve
their cybersecurity response capabilities.

1.2. Research Objectives
IMO and the global maritime industry recognized the importance of cybersecurity, and
they introduced a cybersecurity risk management system from 1 January 2021.
Several related organizations, including BIMCO, have developed cybersecurity
management guidelines and provided shipping companies for managing security
risks. However, so far, there has been no research on whether shipping companies
in each country can implement the guidelines. The dissertation plans to sample
Korean shipping companies and investigate their status of implementing the
guidelines' security requirements and identifying cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
Through this study, shipping companies will be expected to know the cybersecurity
capabilities and cyber risk factors they need to focus on and strengthen.
Understanding the measures to be focused is especially important for small shipping
companies with limited resources.
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1.3. Research Questions
In order to achieve the purpose of this paper, the study begins with the following two
questions.


Are Korean shipping companies implementing significant cybersecurity
elements in cyber risk management guidelines provided by related
organizations such as BIMCO?



What is the correlation between the company’s characteristics and its
cybersecurity vulnerabilities?



What strategies can IMO or States choose to improve cybersecurity
vulnerabilities?

1.4. Scope of Study
The shipping industry is based on international interaction. A ship can sail to any port
in any country in the world and exchange information with many stakeholders such
as ports authorities, terminals, Vessel Traffic Services (VTS), and Shipping agents in
the country. Therefore, it is reasonable that a global survey should be conducted to
understand the cybersecurity status of the shipping industry. However, due to the
limitations of time and information, it is challenging to investigate cybersecurity
management situations in all countries of the world. Therefore, in this paper, Cases
of a particular country have been sampled for the survey. The sampling country is
South Korea. South Korea is one of the world’s largest shipping countries. It has the
advantage of reflecting on various shipping environments when investigating because
both the coastal shipping industry and ocean-going shipping industry are developed.
Above all, the ship management industry has developed. There is an association with
150 shipping companies as its members, making it relatively easy to obtain the
necessary data through the association.

Cybersecurity research in the shipping industry can consider various targets such as
ships, companies, transportation systems, and ports. An analysis of vulnerabilities
can also be conducted among hardware such as computers and networks, software
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such as vaccine programs, and cybersecurity management systems. However, this
paper analyses how effectively shipping companies manage cybersecurity for their
ships according to guidelines such as IMO and BIMCO. Therefore, the cybersecurity
vulnerabilities of related organizations such as port authorities and the cybersecurity
weaknesses of ship’s computers or networks are excluded from the study in this
paper.

1.5. Methods
Cybersecurity threat countermeasures that shipping companies must comply with will
be identified by using previous studies and cybersecurity management guidelines
from IMO and organizations such as BIMCO, International Electrotechnical
Commission(IEC). The countermeasures are organized and listed in the term of
cybersecurity elements. Cybersecurity elements are classified into three parts such
as administrative security, technology security, and physical security.

An e-mail survey is conducted on Korean shipping companies and ship safety
management companies for cybersecurity elements identified in the first stage. In
addition, the survey examines the general status and the cybersecurity characteristics
of companies together. The level of companies’ implementation of cybersecurity
elements is checked through questionnaire analysis.

Security vulnerability means the actual state of implementation of cybersecurity
elements. The correlation between the security vulnerabilities identified in the
previous step and the companies’ characteristics, such as the company’s size,
maintaining security personnel, and utilizing external cybersecurity experts is
analyzed.

The paper synthesizes the analysis results of the previous step, analyzes the
strengths and weaknesses of Korean shipping companies in implementing
cybersecurity elements, and suggests the most effective countermeasures to
strengthen security vulnerabilities.
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2. Literature review and Definitions
2.1. Literature review
Park et al. of Korea Maritime Institute [KMI] (2019) analyzed trends, security
technologies, and cybersecurity policies of major countries through a Study on
Strengthening Cyber-security System in the Maritime Sector and proposed measures
to improve vulnerabilities in marine cybersecurity. In particular, 27 cybersecurity
hazards were identified using BIMCO's security guidelines and ISO/IEC's security
standards. In addition, in this study, risk assessment was conducted on the 27
identified cybersecurity elements, and based on the assessment, it was proposed to
improve cybersecurity vulnerability. However, the risk assessment of cybersecurity
elements is evaluated only by the possibility of occurrence and the magnitude of the
impact, so it does not show how the shipping companies respond to each
cybersecurity element.

Tam and Jones of the University of Plymouth (2018) performed a cyber-risk
assessment on Autonomous ships by the MaCRA model. This work identified
vulnerabilities in cutting-edge sensor networks and remote access, giving an
exemplary insight into future automated ship security threats. Tam et al. (2016) also
described various cyberattacks on ships in a study of threat and impact in Maritime
cybersecurity based on scenarios. They suggested countermeasures against
cyberattacks such as ship software updates and password usage. However, there is
a limitation of model analysis with no empirical case investigation at all.

Jo Y.H. and Cha Y.K. of Korea University (2019) identified cybersecurity threats from
ships in a study of cybersecurity requirements of ship Using Threat Modeling. The
study evaluated the importance of each type of security threats through STRIDE
(Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service) model,
and identified possible threats for each element of the Data-flow diagram through
analysis of various cyberattack cases, and proposed the separation of onboard
networks to minimize cyber threats. However, it did not present an analysis of the ship
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company's security management capabilities and a plan to strengthen the company's
security accordingly

Androjna et al. (2020) analyzed the threats and incidents of various cyberattacks on
ships, ports, and autonomous ships in an article titled Assessing Cyber Challenges of
Maritime Navigation. In particular, this article evaluated the vulnerability of various
equipment on ships such as GPS and eLoran through rich literature investigations as
well as accident cases.

Song et al. (2018) analyzed the characteristics and types of recent cyberattacks and
investigated cyberattack warning systems and analysis methodologies through a
Korea Institute of Science and Technology report. In particular, this report is evaluated
to give a better understanding of several cyberattack methods to the victim
organizations and help to develop proper countermeasures against cyberattacks
through in-depth analysis of actual attacks. However, this study has limitations in
explaining the specificity of cybersecurity in maritime fields such as ship companies
and ships.

Do (2019) investigated trends in international standards for cybersecurity and
representative cybersecurity threat analysis techniques such as Microsoft's STRIDE
model, Tony UcedaVelea's PASTA (The Process for Attack Simulation and Threat
Analysis) model, SEI(Software Engineering Institute)’s OCTAVE(Operationally
Critical

Threat

Asset

Telecommunications

and

Vulnerability

Standards

Institute)’s

Evaluation),
TVRA(Threat,

and

ETSI(European

Risk,

Vulnerability

Analysis).

Baltic and International Maritime Council [BIMCO] et al. (2020) developed the
guidelines on cyber security onboard ships so that shipping companies can assess
and manage cyber risks. The guideline provided guidance on overviews of
cyberattacks, identification of cyber threats and vulnerabilities, risk assessment
methods, protective measures, recovery plans, and incident investigations.

14

2.2. Definitions
This chapter defines the principal terms used in this paper. Since most terms have
academic definitions, they will borrow definitions from other professional books or
papers. However, some terms were coined to facilitate the description of this paper.
There will be no need for an argument because the definition of terms made in this
paper is only for the convenience of explaining the situation.

a) Coefficient of determination (R2): In statistics, the coefficient of determination
R2 measures the model's ability to predict or explain results in linear
regression settings. In general, a high R2 value indicates that the model is
suitable for data (Enders, 2020). The value of R2 is obtained by squared
Pearson correlation coefficient (R).
b) Company’s cybersecurity capabilities: This results from measuring the
environment in which the company can perform cybersecurity work on ships.
Three areas of organization & human resources, employee expertise,
education & training were investigated, and the results were analyzed in
Chapter 6.1.4. (Author).

c) Cronbach's Alpha coefficient: This is a value that measures the internal
consistency for the purpose of verifying the reliability of each measurement
variable, and if it is 0.6 or higher, it is usually judged that the reliability is high
reliable (Chae, as cited by Lee, 2012).

d) Cybersecurity: The activity or process, ability or capability to protect and/or
defend information and communication systems and the information
contained therein from damage, unauthorized use, modification, or abuse
(Department of Homeland Security [DHS], as cited by Craigen at el.,2014).
e) Cybersecurity elements: Important measures to strengthen cybersecurity
extracted from cybersecurity guidelines issued by organizations such as
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BIMCO and ISO/IEC. In this paper, the list of security elements in Table 2
made by KMI is utilized (Author).
f)

Cybersecurity managers: Employees in charge of cybersecurity of ships in a
shipping company or ship management company (Author).

g) Cybersecurity manpower: The size of workforce held by a shipping company
or a ship management company to perform cybersecurity work on a ship. A
company's manpower is obtained by multiplying the company's number of
cybersecurity managers by the average DR (Author).
h) Dedicated rate of cybersecurity manager (DR): It refers to the ratio of
cybersecurity-related tasks of ships among the total tasks of cybersecurity
managers (Author).
i)

Interval scale: The interval scale is a type of metric scale and reflects
quantitative values. In interval scales, the location parameters mode, median
and mean can be calculated. An interval scale can always be divided into
equal portion scales (Statista, 2021).

j)

Likert scale: The Likert scale is an ordinal scale measuring subjective
emotions and attitudes. However, when the Likert scale is used for many
questions, the number of response cases increases rapidly, so it can be
considered as an interval scale and analyzed by a parametric method (Kim et
al., 2016).

k) Ordinal scale: Ordinal data is a categorical, statistical data type where the
variables have natural, ordered categories, and the distances between the
categories are not known. The ordinal scale is distinguished from the nominal
scale by having a ranking. It also differs from the interval scale by not having
category widths representing equal increments of the underlying attribute
(Wikipedia, 2021).
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l)

Pearson correlation coefficient (R): This is a value obtained by dividing the
covariance of two variables by the product of each standard deviation in data
on an equal interval scale or proportional scale. It quantifies the linear
correlation between the two variables X and Y. Pearson's correlation
coefficient has a value between +1 and -1, +1 means a perfect positive linear
correlation, 0 means no linear correlation, and -1 means a perfect negative
linear correlation (Wikipedia, 2021).

m) Risk: Potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or
occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences
(DHS, 2010).

n) Risk assessment: product or process which collects information and assigns
values to risks for the purpose of informing priorities, developing or comparing
courses of action, and informing decision making (DHS, 2010). Qualitative risk
assessment is obtained by multiplying the Likelihood index and the severity
index (Park et al., 2019)

o) Vulnerability: physical feature or operational attribute that renders an entity
open to exploitation or susceptible to a given hazard (DHS, 2010). In this
paper, the degree of implementation of the shipping company for
cybersecurity elements is defined as vulnerability (Author).
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3. Methodology
3.1. Data Collection
Data were collected by conducting a survey of South Korean shipping companies or
ship management companies on their ship cybersecurity management status. The
questionnaire in appendix 1 was used for the survey.

The questionnaire consisted of 46 questions in three areas. The first area is questions
about the names, contacts, and companies of the people surveyed. The second area
is a general field that consists of questions about general matters concerning ship
cybersecurity management, including the size of the ship managed by the company,
the number of ship security personnel, the implementation of security training, and
the support of external experts. The third is questions about security elements to
counter cyber threats, which are subdivided into administrative security, technical
security, and physical security; each part has nine separate questions. The list of
questions in this third area (a total of 27 questions in three parts) used a table on the
cybersecurity risk factors of a study of Korea Maritime Institute (KMI), ‘A Study on
Strengthening Cybersecurity System in Maritime Sector (2019)’. This table is made in
consideration of the frequency of control failure and influence in the event of failure to
control the ship's cybersecurity elements (Park et al., 2019).

The questionnaire was translated into Korean and distributed to about 150 Korean
shipping companies and ship management companies to enhance the understanding
of Korean participants. Of these, 38 valid survey results were collected from 22
companies (14.7% response rate). Some companies submitted several survey
results, each written by a different person, and then the results were included in the
statistical analysis in which the company’s redundancy was not problematic. Based
on the number of companies, the survey response rate is very low at 14.7%.
However, based on the number of ships, the response rate is high. This is because
the number of management vessels of the companies that responded was 762
vessels, which is 70.4% of Korea's Ocean-going vessels as of 2019 (KMI, 2020).
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Figure 1. Surveyed vessel status compared to the registered vessel (the surveyed
vessel includes some domestic vessels)
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
0-4,999 Gross tons

5,000-9,999 Gross tons

Korean ocean-going ships (2019)

10,000 or More
Gross tons

total

Surveyed ships (2021)

The statistics are relatively less accurate because of differences at the time of
surveys, and the 2021 surveyed vessels include some domestic vessels. However,
referring to figure 1, it can be seen that almost all ships were surveyed for more than
10,000 gross tons (GT) of Ocean-going ships. On the other hand, only about 16
percent of ships between 5,000 GT and 9,999 GT were surveyed, while 41 percent
were surveyed for ships less than 4,999 GT.

The IMO resolution on ship security (MSC 428) has been implemented, but most
countries, including South Korea, have yet to enforce it. However, it is known that the
US and Singapore are forcing the implementation of cyber security measures for
ships and confirming them through PSC. In addition, oil carriers and bulk carriers have
been implementing cybersecurity measures for ships since 2017 in accordance with
the regulations of the Oil Major inspection and Bulk Ship Shipper Association. As a
result, large ships that carry crude oil or bulk cargo and ships that sail to the US or
Singapore are generally already implementing cybersecurity measures for ships
before 2021. On the other hand, ships sailing only in South Korea's domestic ports
and neighboring countries such as China, Japan, or Southeast Asia, are mostly not
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implementing cybersecurity measures. This situation would explain figure 1, in which
more than 10,000 GT of vessels have almost 100 percent response rate, while less
than 10,000 GT have less than 50 percent response rate. More than 10,000 GT of
ships are likely to be VLCCs or BULK Carriers, which carry crude oil or bulk cargo,
and ships that sail to the USA or Singapore are bigger than ships that sail neighboring
countries such as China, Japan, or Southeast Asia. Companies that manage ships
sailing only in the nearby waters of Korea generally have low awareness of
cybersecurity. In some cases, even the person in charge of cybersecurity is not
designated, so they do not even take the survey questionnaires. On the other hand,
as shown in the graph above, most companies that operate more than 10,000 GT of
ships are believed to have filled out and replied to the survey questionnaires.

3.2. Data analysis
The company's cybersecurity management environment is identified through analysis
of the first and second areas of the questionnaire. The analysis of the third area
examines the security vulnerabilities of each company for each cybersecurity
element. Eventually, it correlates the security vulnerabilities of each company with the
characteristics of the company identified in the second area (management ship size,
security manager number, security training, etc.).

3.2.1 Reliability analysis of data
Before analyzing the collected data, it is necessary to analyze the reliability of the
data. Reliability analysis is an essential part of research methods that analyse how
similar results are shown without being affected by time or circumstances, even if
respondents repeat the same survey (Jeong & Choi, as cited by Lee, 2012).

This paper verifies reliability using the Cronbach's Alpha coefficient for 27 question
answers in questionnaire area 3. Generally, a Cronbach's Alpha value of 0.6 or higher
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is considered reliable, and 0.8 or higher is considered highly reliable (Chae, as cited
by Lee, 2012).

Using the SPSS Ver. 28 program, the Cronbach's Alpha coefficient of questionnaire
area 3 (27 questions) was calculated, showing very high reliability at 0.934. The
Cronbach's Alpha values of three sub-parts of the questionnaire area 3 are
respectively 0.878 (Sub-part 3-1 Administrative Security), 0.869 (Sub-part 3-2
Technical Security), and 0.825 (Sub-part 3-3 Physical Security), which also
demonstrate high reliability. In other words, the survey results of the questionnaire
area 3 to check the cybersecurity status of shipping companies mean that even if the
environment or time of the survey is changed, it can produce quite consistent results.
Table 1. Reliability analysis result for the questionnaire Area 3 (Cronbach’s Alpha)

Reliability
(Cronbach’s
Alpha)

Administrative
Security
(9 questions)

Technical
Security
(9 questions)

Physical
Security
(9 questions)

Area 3 total
(27 questions)

0.878

0.869

0.825

0.934

3.2.2. Vulnerability Analysis
Wikipedia (2021) defines vulnerability as "a weakness which can be exploited by
a threat actor, such as an attacker, to cross privilege within a computer system.” The
Risk Lexicon of US Department of Home Land Security (DHS) (2010) defines as
“characteristic of the design, location, security posture, operation, or any combination
thereof, that renders an asset, system, network, or entity susceptible to disruption,
destruction, or exploitation.” However, unlike risk, vulnerability is not clearly defined
to be measured in objective figures.

On the other hand, The risk can be expressed by multiplying the likelihood and
severity in Equation (Yoo & Park., 2021). Therefore, it is easy to represent the degree
of risk in objective figures. Yoo and Park (2021) conducted risk assessment on 27
cybersecurity elements (See table 2) through a survey of cybersecurity experts, which
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obtained the value of risk levels for each security element as a multiplication of the
frequency of accidents and severity of damage (See figure 2).
Table 2. cybersecurity elements (source: Journal of Marine Science and
Engineering, 2021)
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Figure 2. The risk level of 27 cybersecurity elements (source: Journal of Marine
Science and Engineering, 2021)

Figure 2 shows that A7 1 (control the use of portable media) and T6 2 (Install antimalicious code software and regularly install patch files) are classified as high risks.
Yoo and Park (2021) evaluated the confidence in the survey using the Analytic
Hierarchy Process (AHP) and the Consistency Index (CI) to derive the above results.
The high-risk levels of A7 and T6 may be empirically inferable, even if the adequacy
of the method is not discussed. Portable equipment such as USB can always be an
easy and effective striker in cybersecurity. In addition, computer systems that do not
have anti-malicious code software or are not adequately patched can also be exposed

A7 refers to Cybersecurity element No. 7 “Control the use of portable media(USB, portable
PC, etc.)” of the Administrative Security part of Table 2.
1

T6 refers to Cybersecurity element No. 6 “Install anti-malicious code software and
regularly install patch files” of the Technical Security part of Table 2.
2
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to cyberattacks at any time. Therefore, it may be natural that the A7 or T6 was
analyzed as a high-risk element.
However, high-risk cybersecurity elements such as A7 and T6 do not always mean
high vulnerabilities against cybersecurity threats. For example, mobile storage
devices such as USB can be easily accessed and used by anyone, resulting in
frequent cybersecurity incidents. Its large storage capacity can cause significant
damage to the system. Therefore, No wonder mobile storage devices have a very
high-risk value that is calculated by multiplying the severity and the frequency of the
accident.

However, if a company prohibits using personal USB and uses USB authentication
and security programs on all computers, the company's cybersecurity vulnerability to
A7 items will be very low. That is, for 27 cybersecurity elements in Table 2, the level
of cybersecurity risk and the cybersecurity vulnerabilities may not match.
In a Guide to risk and vulnerability analysis, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
(2012) stated that vulnerability analysis is to identify more detailed problems with
scenarios in which risk analysis has already been performed. Therefore, in order to
get a deeper understanding of cybersecurity, it is necessary to analyze vulnerabilities
against 27 cybersecurity elements in Table 2 that Yoo and Park3 (2021) or Park et al
(2019) assessed for risk.

DHS Risk Lexicon (2010) defines a vulnerability as a possibility of success when an
attack is attempted. Therefore, To identify vulnerabilities, it is more reasonable to
evaluate how the victim is preparing for the attack, rather than assessing the
possibility or magnitude of the attack's impact.

3 A study of Yoo and Park (2021), Qualitative Risk Assessment of Cybersecurity and
Development of Vulnerability Enhancement Plans in Consideration of Digitalized Ship, was
published in English in the Journal of Marine Science and Engineering by extraction the risk
assessment part from a Study on Strengthening Cybersecurity System in the Maritime
Sector (Park et al., 2019).

24

The cybersecurity vulnerabilities of the companies surveyed are identified using a
Likert 5 points scale (See Table 3) for 27 cybersecurity elements of Table 2. Kim et
al. (2016) said that the Likert scale is categorized as an ordinal scale because it
measures individual subjective emotions and attitudes. Therefore it is generally
inappropriate to use parametric methods for the Likert scale. However, Kim et al
(2016) also said that if the Likert scale is used for many questions, the number of
possible response cases increases rapidly, so it can be considered as interval scale
and thus analysed as parametric method. Therefore, 27 questions in Area 3 (Ship
Cybersecurity Management) of Appendix 1 used the Likert scale can be analysed
using the parametric method. However, the average value for individual questions is
not statistical values for many questions. So it just will use to check trends rather than
statistical meanings.
As you can see in Table 3, The respondents were asked to select (1) ‘Strongly
disagree’ if they considered the most vulnerable to the question item and (5) ‘Strongly
agree’ if vice versa. Therefore, the most vulnerable element of cybersecurity gets one
point, and the least vulnerable element of cybersecurity gets five points. In addition,
‘Not applicable’ can be selected if the answer to the question is not understood,
considering the respondents who are not familiar with cybersecurity tasks. ‘Not
applicable’ was excluded from vulnerability analysis for selected items. This is to
increase the reliability of the survey by preventing a rough guess from responding
without an understanding of the exact cybersecurity status of their own company or
vessels.
Table 3. Likert 5 points scale of answers for Appendix 1 Area 3 questions

Point

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(0)

Status

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
agree

Not
applicable

The vulnerability of individual companies was determined by the average of the
answers to 27 items in Area3 of the questionnaire. The smaller the average value
means the greater the vulnerability to cybersecurity, and the evaluation of the degree
of vulnerability is based on Table 4. The quantifiable evaluation of survey results, such
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as Table 4, is because the statistical processing results of many Likert scale questions
can be considered interval scale, not ordinal scale.
Table 4. Vulnerability Rating table

Average
value
Vulnerability
Rating

1.0 ~ Less
than 1.8

1.8 ~ Less
than 2.6

2.6 ~ Less
than 3.4

3.4 ~ Less
than 4.2

4.2 ~ 5

Very
Vulnerable

Vulnerable

Neutral

Invulnerable

Very
Invulnerable

3.2.3. Correlation Analysis
The level of cybersecurity vulnerabilities in individual companies can be identified
through questionnaire analysis. However, vulnerability analysis does not show why
each company represents such a difference in cybersecurity level. In this paper, the
correlation between company characteristics (such as the size of the company,
cybersecurity personnel, education and training) and security vulnerabilities is found
through correlation analysis.
Correlation analysis can use parametric and nonparametric methods depending on
whether the data are normally distributed. Parametric methods include Pearson
correlation, and nonparametric correlation involves Spearman and Kendall's Tau.
However, we confirmed earlier that even the original ordinal scale could be
considered an interval scale if the number of questions increases. Therefore,
parametric methods can be used for Likert scale surveys with multiple questions. In
the end, one of the parametric methods, Pearson correlation analysis, can be used to
correlate the value of a company's security vulnerability derived from the result of the
Likert scale survey of multiple questions.
Correlation is analyzed between the company’s characters such as the number of
management vessels, total tonnage of ships, cybersecurity personnel, expertise in
cybersecurity managers, education & training and the company's cybersecurity
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vulnerabilities using an Excel program's Pearson correlation tool(the Scatterplot
Trend Line and CORREL function).
Correlation refers to the relevance of changes in two variables, and covariance can
mathematically explain the relevance. Pearson correlation coefficient(R) adjusted the
range of covariances from -1 to +1 to facilitate the interpretation of correlations.

A value of r of 0 indicates that there is no linear relationship between the two variables,
and a larger absolute value of r means that the relationship between variables
becomes stronger, and an absolute value of r of 1 means that all data is precisely in
a straight line (Patrick et al., 2018). Several methods are proposed for the
interpretation of correlation coefficients, and Table 5 is one of the examples.

Table 5. Example of a Conventional Approach to Interpreting a Correlation Coefficient
(Source: Patrick et al., 2018)
Absolute Magnitude of the Observed

Interpretation

Correlation Coefficient
0.00-0.10

Negligible correlation

0.10-0.39

Weak correlation

0.40-0.69

Moderate correlation

0.70-0.89

Strong correlation

0.90-1.00

Very strong correlation

Patrick et al. (2018) noted that in interpreting correlation coefficients, it is desirable to
interpret the relationship strength of a particular coefficient in the context of scientific
questions rather than mechanically applying the analysis criteria, as shown in the
example above. Therefore, it is desirable to understand that although this paper also
basically correlates with the criteria in Table 5, it merely represents the tendency of
relationship strength between variables.

The coefficient of determination is calculated in addition to the correlation coefficient
analysis. The coefficient of determination(R2) can be obtained by the square of the r
value, indicating the degree to which the estimated linear model fits the given data.
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4. Overview of Cybersecurity
The fourth industrial revolution, which has terms such as big data, cloud computing,
artificial intelligence, and cyber-physical systems as its core concepts, is now having
a massive impact on our world. Suppose the third industrial revolution is the transition
from analogue to digital. In that case, the fourth industrial revolution is characterized
by the combination of industry, automation, digitalization, and Internet of Things (IoT)
technologies (Adebayo et al., 2019).
Figure 3. The four levels of the Industrial Revolution (Source: JMESS, 2019)

In particular, the 4th industrial revolution is accelerating further as the
commercialization of 5th generation mobile communication(5G), a core infrastructure
of the 4th industrial revolution, is promoted worldwide. 5G's data communication
speed is about 40 times faster than the 4th generation(4G) Long Term Evolution (LTE)
mobile communication technology. It can connect 1 million IoT devices within 1km at
the same time and has a communication delay of 0.001 seconds or less, which is
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expected to play an important role in IoT, autonomous driving, Virtual/Augmented
Reality (VR/AR), Cloud computing, Big Data, Artificial intelligence (AI) (Kim & Lee,
2018).

Although there is no doubt that the 5G network will play an essential role as a spinal
network of the 4th industrial revolution due to the characteristics of high-speed largecapacity communication, high-reliability ultra-low-latency communication, and massconnected

communication,

Cybersecurity

risks

are

expected

to

increase

exponentially due to complex connections between 5G network and existing
communication networks (4G,3G), the Internet, and various IoT devices. In particular,
deterioration in security performance caused by differences in security characteristics
between other devices or networks connected to 5G networks can be a big challenge
(Kim et al., 2019).

Figure 4. the business cost of cybercrime incidents in 2019 (Source: Beaming)

According to Five Years in Cyber Security (2020) of Beaming, British companies lost
nearly £13 billion in 2019 due to cybercrimes such as phishing, malware, ransomware,
and hacking. The average loss per crime is about £6,000, with IoT hacking the largest
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loss per case at about £31,000, followed by Cryptojacking at about £150,000. The
type of cybercrime that caused the greatest loss is phishing, and the type of crime
that caused the smallest damage is ransomware (See Figure 4). Here, we looked at
cases of cybercrime damage in a country like the UK, but most countries where
informatization is developed in the world are exposed to such various forms of
cybercrime, and the damage is increasing every year. In a special report on
cybersecurity, Morgan (2020) predicted that global cybercrime-related costs, which
stood at $6 trillion in 2021, will increase by 15% annually to $10.5 trillion by 2025.

The reason why cybercrime is increasing is that it has become easier to commit
cybercrime with the use of new technologies such as the automatic creation of
malware and the development of the stolen data black market. And revitalization of
the virtual currency market has made it easier to cash in cybercrime (Ha, 2019). As
time goes by, the cybersecurity environment is expected to become more complex
because the spread of 5G networks and IoT devices can be a means for
cybercriminals to access targets at high speed through various channels.

To cope with this situation, the international community and countries around the
world are preparing countermeasures against cybercrime. First of all, the International
Telecommunication Unit (ITU) created guidelines for establishing cybersecurity
policies in each country in 2011. The United States enacted and implemented the EGovernment Act in 2002 for information security and confidential information
protection. In 2014, Federal Information Security Modernization Act, National
Cybersecurity Protection Act, and National Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure
Protection Act were enacted or revised to protect vital infrastructure. In the case of
Japan, the National Center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cyber Security
(NISC) was established and operated as a state agency under the Basic Act on Cyber
Security in 2015. In Korea, the Information and Communication Infrastructure
Protection Act was enacted and implemented in 2001 to protect information and
communication-related infrastructure. In 2019, the Information and Communication
Network Act was revised to protect the information in the private sector.
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5. Cyber threats in the maritime sector
Stokes et al. (2018) investigated the perceptions of senior maritime stakeholders from
more than 50 countries and reported that "cyber attacks and data theft" will become
the most critical issue in maritime trade over the next decade. In particular, it was
analyzed that cyberattacks and data theft issues are most likely to occur among major
issues, and their impact is very large. On the other hand, the maritime industry's
readiness for this issue was found to be the weakest.
Figure 5. Global Maritime Issue map (Source: Global Maritime Forum (2018), Global
Maritime Issue Monitor 2018, p7)

In fact, cyberattacks in the maritime industry seem to have been increasing recently.
Cyber-attacks on large shipping companies such as MSC have been occurring for the
fourth consecutive year since 2017, and Safety4sea (2020) said important cyber-
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attacks on operational technology (OT) in the maritime industry had increased nearly
ten times from 50 cases in 2017 to almost 500 cases in 2020.
However, as shown in Table 6, shipping companies and ports still occupy most of the
cyberattacks in the maritime sector rather than ships.
Table 6. cases of cyberattacks in the maritime sector

Attacked
Date

Target

2017.2

8,250 TEU
Germanowned
container
ship

2017.6

Maersk line’s
digital
infrastructure

2017.11

Clarksons’s
computer
system

2018.7

COSCO’s
Long Beach
customer
service
center

Attack
Methods

outcome

Take control of
Ship’s OT
system

Hackers took
full control of
the navigation
system of the
ship for 10
hours

The ship had
to bring IT
Fairplay &
experts on
Safety at
board to
Sea(SAS)
regain control

Not Petya virus
(ransomware)

$250-300
Million financial
loss

Re-Installed
45,000 PCs,
2,500
applications

Digital
Ship

Single &
Isolated user
account
(Unauthorised
access)

Unauthorized
access to the
company’s
computer
system

Clarksons
took
Immediate
steps to
respond to
the incident

Digital
Ship

Cyberhackers
(ransomware)

COSCO’s
website and
toll-free number
were down

unknown

Professio
nal
Mariner
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Response

Source

COSCO US
branch’s
business
system

Ransomware
attacks on email systems
and networks

Discontinued
COSCO
business e-mail
and telephone
service in the
US Regions

Port of San
Diego

Hackers who
were demanding
Bitcoins
(ransomware)

Ransomware
had penetrated
its system

‘H’ shipping
company
Car carriers

Ships’ main
computers
Infection with
ransomware by
the e-mail file
impersonating
the Police
Agency.

Become
unusable of
ships’
computers

MSC’s Datacenter

Data-center
attacked by
malware

Main customer
websites were
down for
several days

Customer
Website
restoration

2020.9

US Tug boat

Spoofing attack
through an
attached file of
voice e-mail

None

Report it to
the relevant
authorities

2020.9

CMA CGM
Container
transportatio
n main
system

Online system
ransomware
(Ragnar Locker)
attack

Container
transportation
reservation and
transportation
confirmation
system down.

Services
(booking,
tracking,
invoice, etc.)
be restored
in 2 weeks.

2018.7

2018.9

2019.3

2020.4

System
recovery

KMI

Shut down
computers of
port
operation

Seatrade
Cruise
News

Infection
computer
FINANCI
format, loss
AL NEWS
data rewritten
again.

Seatrade
Maritime
News
Shiptechnolog
y.com

Shipping
NewsNet

In line with the recent trend of technological innovation on land, various technological
innovations such as e-Navigation, autonomous ships are accelerating in the shipping
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industry. The application of advanced ICT technology to ships means that there will
be a channel of connection between ships and land networks. Eventually, as
discussed in the previous chapter, the threat in terms of the cybersecurity of ships will
increase as the ship's computer (or system) access increases.

As can be seen from the IMO e-Navigation architecture in Figure 6 below, physical
connections between land systems and ship systems must exist for various enavigation services.

Figure 6. IMO overarching e-navigation architecture (Source : IMO)

In addition, the Autonomous Ship concept of MUNIN (Maritime Unmanned Navigation
through Intelligence in Networks) Project also explains that communication between
the systems of these ships and the land system is necessary to control the
Autonomous Ship or Remote Ship (See Figure 7).
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Figure 7. The Autonomous Ship concept of MUNIN (Source: MUNIN)

IMO adopted a resolution to integrate the guidelines for cybersecurity into ships SMS
in 2017, taking into account the ever-increasing trend of cyberattacks and advanced
ICT technology application to ships in the maritime industry. The resolution has been
in effect since January 2021. In addition, BIMCO has produced and distributed
cybersecurity guidelines for the cybersecurity work of ship companies.
However, unlike land’s responses to enacting and implementing cybersecurity-related
laws or establishing government organizations responding to cyberattacks, even
IMO's resolutions are not mandatory but recommendations. Due to the nature of ships
sailing around the world, it isn't easy to establish a land-level cybersecurity system for
the maritime industry with a country's efforts. Therefore, first of all, cybersecurity
guidelines provided by IMO or BIMCO should be faithfully implemented by shipping
companies around the world, and cybersecurity should be sufficiently considered
when designing the architecture of e-Navigation or autonomous ships.
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6. Analysis of Vulnerability of Korean shipping companies on
Cybersecurity Threats
6.1. General status

6.1.1. Size of managed vessels of the surveyed companies

The survey of Appedix1 questionnaire received a total of 38 responses from 22
companies. The number of management vessels of these companies varied from at
least one to up to 120, but almost all companies have more than ten vessels except
for five companies. The total number of ships managed by the companies was 762,
and the average worked ships for one company was 34.6.

Figure 8. Distribution of managed ships in surveyed companies
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According to the size distribution of the ships managed by these companies, the ship’s
number of 10,000 GT or more is 620, accounting for 81.4 percent of the total, and the
ship’s number of less than 10,000 GT is 142 accounting for 18.6 percent. Among the
22 companies, eight were identified as having an average ship’s size of less than
10,000 GT, and 14 companies were identified as having an average ship’s size of
10,000 GT or more. In addition, companies that manage more than 10,000 GT of
vessels have high response rates on questionnaires, which was explained in Chapter
3.1.

6.1.2. Establishment of cybersecurity management procedures

Of the 38 respondents, 31 were aware that the IMO resolution on the Maritime Cyber
Risk Management in Safety Management System (MSC. 428) was implemented in
January 2021, and only seven respondents were unaware.

In addition, 26 out of 38 respondents said that the company's SMS had incorporated
regulations on cybersecurity under MSC.428, three responding to "NO" and nine
responding to "Unknown."

33 out of 38 respondents said the procedure of cybersecurity management was
established, two did not, and three did not know whether the company established its
own cybersecurity procedures regardless of the integration of cybersecurity
regulations to ship’s Safety Management System.

When asked why the cybersecurity management procedure on ships was established,
there

were

20

cases

respectively

of

cybercrime

prevention

and

IMO's

recommendations for ships, followed by 11 PSC responses and seven shippers'
demands. This question can be answered multiple times, so the number of responses
was higher than the total number of responses.

37

6.1.3. Cybersecurity manpower in the company

In a survey of the company's cybersecurity managers, four companies have no
cybersecurity manager, five companies have one manager, nine companies have two
managers, five companies have three managers, five companies have four
managers, seven companies have five managers, one company has seven
managers, and one company has 12 managers.
And the company's cybersecurity manager was asked how much of an individual's
work time is related to cybersecurity. Regarding this question, One company
answered 60%, two companies were 30%, four companies were 20%, nine
companies were 10%, eight companies were 5%, and the rest did not answer. Here,
these rates are called the dedicated rate (DR) of cybersecurity managers.

DR is an important factor in determining the size of the company's actual
cybersecurity workforce. For example, a company with five cybersecurity managers
with 20% DR has the same manpower effect as a company with one cybersecurity
manager with 100% DR.

The following graph shows the results of calculating the Manpower of the company's
ship cybersecurity work with the surveyed value of DR. The blue bar represents the
number of ship cybersecurity managers by company. Orange bars represent
Manpower for ship cybersecurity work as a result of multiplying the number of security
personnel by the DR. In the graph, the number of cybersecurity managers varies from
1 to 12, and the average number of cybersecurity managers in 25 companies is 3.44
people. Manpower has a minimum of 0.1 to a maximum of 3 and an average of 0.554.
Here, one manpower means that one cybersecurity manager performs 8 hours of
cybersecurity-related work on one working day. The graph below shows that most
companies have more than one cybersecurity manager on the surface, but in reality,
most companies operate cybersecurity personnel with less than one.
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Figure 9. Manpower of cybersecurity managers
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6.1.4. Company’s cybersecurity capabilities
Parts 2-8 through 2-9 of Appendix 1 assess the company's capabilities in terms of
ship cybersecurity. The question is whether the company has sufficient organizational
and human resources for managing ship cybersecurity, whether the company's
cybersecurity managers have sufficient expertise, and whether the company provides
adequate education and training about ship cybersecurity. For each survey, 5-point
Likert scale was used as same as Table 3.
Table 7. Company’s cybersecurity capabilities

Very
Vulnerable Neutral
Vulnerable (1.8~2.6)
(2.6~3.4)
(1~1.8)
organizational
▪
2.57
& human
resources
expertise
▪
2.94

▪

Education &
training
total

2.82

▪
2.69
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Invulnerable Very
(3.4~4.2)
Invulnerable
(4.2~5)

The survey results showed that the vulnerability of the company's comprehensive ship
cybersecurity response capability was Neutral at 2.69. However, the organizational &
human resources sector is 2.57 points, showing the rating of Vulnerable. On the other
hand, the expertise, education & training sectors had 2.94 and 2.82 points,
respectively, indicating the rating of Neutral.

The company's cybersecurity capability were analyzed for companies with an average
ship’s size of less than 10,000 GT and companies with an average ship’s size of
10,000 GT or more.
Companies with an average ship’s size of less than 10,000 have weak security
capabilities for all items. In particular, the organizational & human resources sectors
were found to be the most vulnerable among the three items with 1.9 points, and when
the three items were evaluated comprehensively, they were more vulnerable with 1.87
points.
Table 8. Cybersecurity capabilities of companies with an average ship’s size of less
than 10,000 GT

Very
Vulnerable Neutral
Vulnerable (1.8~2.6)
(2.6~3.4)
(1~1.8)
organizational
▪
1.9
and human
resources
expertise
▪

Invulnerable Very
(3.4~4.2)
Invulnerable
(4.2~5)

2.14

Education
and training
total

▪
2.0

▪
1.87

For companies with an average ship’s size of 10,000 GT or more, the organizational
& human resources sectors of the company's cybersecurity capabilities were found to
be weak, but the rest were all normal.
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Table 9. Cybersecurity capabilities of companies with an average ship’s size of 10,000
GT or more

Very
Vulnerable Neutral
Vulnerable (1.8~2.6)
(2.6~3.4)
(1~1.8)
organizational
▪
2.57
and human
resources
▪
expertise
2.94

Invulnerable Very
(3.4~4.2)
Invulnerable
(4.2~5)

▪

Education
and training

2.82

▪

total

2.69

Although the results above do not use scientific analysis methods such as correlation
analysis, it can be inferred that the size of the management vessel is related to the
company's cybersecurity response capabilities, as the tendency of the two cases is
evident. In the next chapter, this inference is verified through this correlation analysis
method.

Cybersecurity managers responded to the question of what is needed to strengthen
the company's ability to respond to cybersecurity as follows: Securing professional
personnel and strengthening education & training accounted for the largest portion of
the answers with 18 cases. The operational guidelines for cybersecurity tasks is 7
cases, 6 cases are about providing vaccine programs and security facilities, and 2
cases are about new dedicated organizations or the attention of the chief executive.

6.1.5. Support from outside experts
Five out of 22 companies have been confirmed to be supported by outside experts
(or companies) to respond to cybersecurity tasks for ships. The company's
cybersecurity managers said they were generally satisfied with the cybersecurity
response capabilities of outside experts. Although a company rated dissatisfaction,
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the average satisfaction score was 3.4 points out of 5 points. This is significantly
higher than the company's evaluation score of 2.69 points for its own cybersecurity
response capabilities.

It has been confirmed that the company's cybersecurity managers hope to expand
the use of external experts, including direct and integrated management support
rather than remote management, increase the scope of the professional workforce
and related budget.

6.2. Vulnerability Analysis
6.2.1. Comprehensive analysis
Appendix 1 was used to investigate the company's cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
Cybersecurity elements consist of a total of three parts: Administrative Security (AS),
Technical Security (TS), and Physical Security (PS). AS assesses the state of the
company's policies and support for cybersecurity response, and TS assesses
technical access controls and measures such as encryption of ships' computers and
networks. And the last PS assesses the vessel's physical management status, such
as marking and locking for non-approved access control of the security zone.

According to the vulnerability analysis, the overall vulnerability was found to be
relatively good at 3.47 points. The vulnerability of AS was 3.65 points, The
vulnerability of TS was 3.52, higher than the overall score, and the vulnerability of PS
was 3.27, which is slightly lower than the overall score.

According to a cybersecurity vulnerability analysis by the size of the company,
companies with an average ship’s size of less than 10,000 GT had overall scores of
2.9 points, and administrative, technical, and physical security fields are 2.98, 2.94,
and 2.78 points, respectively. It had a lower value for all parts compared to the
vulnerability value for the entire company. In particular, there was a bigger difference
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in all areas compared to large shipping companies with an average ship’s size of
10,000 GT or more.
Despite the company's size classification, the Physical Security part had the lowest
score among the three security parts. This can be estimated that there are not many
physical measures yet to be taken to strengthen the cybersecurity on individual
vessels, and the details are to be analyzed in the Physical Security sector below.

Figure 10. Cybersecurity Vulnerability of Korean Shipping Companies (Overall)
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Regardless of the companies' average scores, there is a big difference between the
lowest overall scored company(1.74 points) and the highest overall scored
company(4.88points). The company with the lowest score was managing 19 vessels
(vessels between 100 and 5,000 GT) without a dedicated staff in charge of ship
cybersecurity, and it was found that the company did not conduct any special training
or education about ship cybersecurity. The highest-scoring company, on the other
hand, had four employees in charge of cybersecurity on 38 large ships with more than
10,000 GT, and the employees were highly satisfied with the company's expertise,
education and training.
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The distribution of cybersecurity vulnerability scores by the type of companies in the
table below shows that the overall vulnerability is relatively good as 22 companies are
gathered in the Invulnerable and Very Invulnerable area. However, for small
companies with smaller average sizes of vessels, the vulnerability scores are mostly
distributed in subnormal areas compared to the Big Company group with larger
average sizes of vessels.

Table 10. Cybersecurity Vulnerability Score Distribution

Vulnerab
ility
rating

Very
Vulnerable
(1.0~Less
than 1.8)

Vulnerable
(1.8~Less
than 2.6)

Neutral
(2.6~Less
than 3.4)

Big
compani
es

1

0

7

13

Small
compani
es

1

3

3

3

Total

2

3

10

16

Invulnerable
Very
(3.4~Less Invulnerable
than 4.2)
(4.2~5)

6

6

6.2.2. Administrative Security Analysis
The evaluation items of the Administrative Security part are as shown in Table 11,
which uses data on the KMI prior Study on Cybersecurity, as mentioned earlier. The
identification code for Table 11 also comes from Table 2. The order of the
Cyberseruity elements on Table 11 was made in order of the larger risk of the
Cybersecurity elements in the KMI prior study. That is, 3-1-1 element has the highest
risk (Likelihood x Severity), and 3-1-9 element has the lowest risk.
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Table 11. Administrative Security items & Identification code

Cybersecurity elements

Identification
Code

3-1-1. There is control over the mobile media (USB, mobile
PCs, etc.) used in ships.

A7

3-1-2. Periodic upgrades and ongoing maintenance of H/W
and S/W of ship computers* are performed.

A3

3-1-3. Trainings for ship and land staff are provided
periodically to raise awareness on information protection.

A1

3-1-4. Anti-virus and anti-malware S/W tools supplied for
ship computers.

A4

3-1-5. The policy of controlling remote access to ship
computers is being implemented.

A5

3-1-6. Restricting access to ships (port officials, technicians,
agents, etc) is being implemented.

A2

3-1-7. Access to sensitive information is granted only to
authorized employees.

A6

3-1-8. Emergency plans are in place for cyberattacks.

A9

3-1-9. Equipment disposal policies, including data, are being
implemented.

A8

45

Figure 11. Cybersecurity Vulnerability of Korean Shipping Companies (AS Part)

4.5
4

4.18
3.84

3.89

3.71
3.42

3.5
3

4.18
3.89

4.07
3.68

3.86 3.83

3.96

3.5

3.4
3.2

3.1

3.96
3.72

3.89

3.71

3.65

3.45
2.98

2.78

3.13
3.03
2.78

A9

A8

total

3.1

2.9
2.6

2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
A7

A3

A1

A4

all company

A5

A2

Small company

A6

Big company

The Administrative Security part has been shown to have a better security
vulnerability than the other two parts (Technical and Physical). In particular, A7 (3.84
points), A3 (3.89 points), A4 (3.89 points), and A2 (3.83 points) elements get a
relatively high score.

A7 element is about the company's management and control of mobile storage media
such as USB. A3 is about the HW or SW periodic upgrades and maintenance of ships'
computers. A4 is about updates of anti-virus and anti-malware SW, and A2 is about
restrictions on onboard security access to visitors. These items can be easily
implemented using a small budget if the company is interested in cybersecurity.

On the other hand, A8 (3.03 points), A1 (3.42 points), and A9 (3.45 points) elements
get relatively loss vulnerability scores. These elements are about disposal policy of
ship’s equipment, training and awareness education onboard and land personnel for
cybersecurity, the establishment of cyberattack contingency plan. They require a
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relatively high level of understanding and analysis of ship cybersecurity to implement
cybersecurity measures properly.

There was also a gab of security vulnerabilities between large shipping companies
and small companies in the Administrative Security part. In particular, small shipping
companies had a very low-security vulnerability score of 2.6 points in the A1 element,
which corresponds to enhancing employee education and awareness for
cybersecurity. Effective education and awareness of cybersecurity require long-term
professional improvement and efforts by the staff in charge and the development of
appropriate teaching materials. However, using outside experts could affect progress
in the short term.

6.2.3. Technical Security Analysis
In Table 12 below, the cybersecurity elements of the Technical Security part are listed
in order of higher risk values, with the highest risk value of 3-2-1 (T6) element and the
lowest risk value 3-2-9 (T4) element. Figure 12 shows the vulnerability analysis results
for cybersecurity elements in Table 12.

Table 12. Technical Security items & Identification code

Cybersecurity elements

Identification
Code

3-2-1. Anti-malware software is installed on ships' computers,
and periodic patch file updates are made.

T6

3-2-2. Remote access control is performed on a ship's
networks and computers using an encryption key.

T5

3-2-3. Network ports, protocols, and services of ship’s
networks and computers are restricted and controlled.

T1

47

3-2-4. Protection is being provided for e-mail and web
browsers with wired and wireless access to ships' computers.

T8

3-2-5. Network devices such as firewalls, routers, and
switches are configured to protect networks and computers
on board.

T2

3-2-6. Security configurations of hardware and software
(restrictions on access to systems outside of control) are
being implemented.

T7

3-2-7. Cyberattacks detection, prevention, and warning are
being made through the system for onboard networks and
computers.

T3

3-2-8. Support for data backup and recovery is provided for
onboard computers.

T9

3-2-9. Data encryption is taking place through the use of
virtual private networks (VPNs) to connect to onboard
networks.

T4

Figure 12. Cybersecurity Vulnerability of Korean Shipping Companies (TS Part)
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T9

Big companies
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The overall vulnerability value of the Technical Security part is 3.52 points, which is
the middle of the three security parts. Among elements of TS part, T6 (3.84 points)
and T2 (3.79 points) scored relatively high. T6 item is for installation and periodic
patching of anti-malware software, and T2 is for configuration of network devices such
as firewalls, routers, and switches.

On the other hand, the T4 (2.87 points) element on data encryption through virtual
private networks (VPNs) received noticeably lower scores, which seems to reflect the
reality that VPN is difficult to apply to existing networks of ships. Analysis results of
the company's size showed that the security vulnerability scores of large companies
were much better. However, it is difficult to understand those small companies have
the lowest scores for relatively easy-to-action e-mail and web browser protection (T8)
element in the field of technical security.

6.2.4. Physical Security Analysis
Physical security is a part of determining the status of physical protection measures
such as markings, blockers, locks, etc. in the area to protect the ship's main facilities,
equipment, and information. In order to strengthen the physical security of existing
ships, the company may be burdened with costs due to the need to change and
reinforce the ship's structures or facilities

Table 13. Physical Security items & Identification code

Cybersecurity elements

Identification
code

3-3-1. Physical security zones and access control are in place
for important facilities on board.

P1
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3-3-2. Equipment, information, and software are prohibited
from being taken out without prior approval.

P6

3-3-3. Procedures are being implemented to remove and
verify data and license S/W in the event of reuse and disposal
of equipment, including storage media.

P7

3-3-4. Control of unauthorized user access and isolation
procedures for an information system is being implemented

P3

3-3-5. A policy of desk-cleaning for papers, portable storage
media is being implemented.

P9

3-3-6. Physical security design and application to the ship's
offices, workspaces, and critical facilities are being
implemented.

P2

3-3-7. Procedures are being implemented to ensure
continuous availability and confidentiality of equipment from
the shutdown of the ship’s electric power and support
facilities.

P4

3-3-8. Procedures for verifying the protection and
management of users' information on unused equipment are
being implemented.

P8

3-3-9. Procedures are being implemented to protect power
and communication cables that support data transmission
and information facilities.

P5
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Figure 13. Cybersecurity Vulnerability of Korean Shipping Companies (PS Part)
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The Physical Security part received the lowest overall score among the three parts of
security vulnerability assessments. However, P1 scored 3.9 points, higher than A3,
A4 items (3.89) in the administrative part and T6 item (3.84) in the technical field,
which has higher overall scores than the physical security part. This is believed to be
because item P1 is quite similar to physical security zone establishment and access
control measures of the ISPS Code already in place. On the other hand, P9 scored
2.74, the lowest among 27 security vulnerability assessment elements. P9 is very
simple to store documents and portable storage media that need security
management in the ship's bridge or office in storage facilities with locks after use.
However, due to the lack of awareness of security management of documents or
storage media used onboard, many companies do not seem to have taken
appropriate measures.

In conclusion, the Korean shipping company's cybersecurity vulnerability to ships was
relatively good. However, companies managing small vessels showed relatively
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greater vulnerability in all security assessment items than companies managing large
vessels. In particular, some small companies that manage ships under 5,000 GT were
found to be more vulnerable.

Of the three cybersecurity assessment parts (Administrative, Technical, and
Physical), the administrative cybersecurity part, which is related to the company's
support and policy, got the highest ratings, while the physical sector, which requires
relatively large resources, got the lowest ratings. On the other hand, it seemed
necessary to raise awareness of security vulnerability in some items as there have
been relatively low scores in the items where employees can take relatively simple
measures, such as training (A1) and installation of locking devices for storage of
cybersecurity materials (P9).

6.3. Correlation Analysis
In the previous chapter, cybersecurity vulnerabilities were reviewed from the
perspective of cybersecurity elements for each company. This chapter analyzes what
factors these cybersecurity vulnerabilities correlate with within the company.

6.3.1. Correlation between cybersecurity manpower and
cybersecurity vulnerabilities
In chapter 6.1.3, we looked at the current status of cybersecurity personnel of the
companies. It is meaningful to analyze the relevance between cybersecurity
personnel and the company's cybersecurity vulnerabilities because each company
has a large deviation in the cybersecurity workforce, and the organization's workforce
is a crucial factor in identifying the level of work

Figure 14. Correlation between Manpower and vulnerabilities
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The horizontal (X) axis is the manpower value 4 of the security personnel. The
vertical(Y) axis is a cybersecurity vulnerability value of companies calculated in
Chapter 6.2, expressed here as a security level. The lowest point on the security level
is one, and the highest point is five.
In this graph, the Coefficient of Determination (R2) was 0.0253, resulting in a Pearson
Correlation Coefficient(R) of 0.15906. By Table 5 standards, 'Weak correlation' exists
between security personnel manpower and the company's security vulnerabilities,
and the contribution to security vulnerabilities of security manpower is only 2.53%.

4

The manpower value was calculated by multiplying the company's security personnel
index by 100. The security personnel index is calculated by multiplying the total
number of security managers by the dedicated rate, and the 1 dedicated personnel
index means that one security manager performs security work eight hours a day. For
example, if the company has four dedicated personnel and the average dedicated rate
is 20%, the dedicated personnel index is 0.8 and the manpower value is 80. The
manpower value is only to improve the visibility of the graph.
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6.3.2. Correlation between ship’s number and cybersecurity
vulnerabilities
Usually, suppose the company has a large number of management vessels. In that
case, it can be expected that the level of management of the vessel, including
cybersecurity, will be high because sufficient management resources (personnel,
budget) can be invested. Here, the correlation between the number of managed
vessels and the cybersecurity vulnerabilities of individual companies is analyzed.

Figure 15. Correlation between ship’s number and vulnerabilities
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The X-axis is the number of managed vessels of a company, and the Y-axis is the
company-specific cybersecurity vulnerability value calculated in Chapter 6.2. Here,
the coefficient of determination R2 = 0.0988 and a Pearson Correlation Coefficient R
= 0.314325. In accordance with Table 5, the correlation between the number of
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managed ships and cybersecurity vulnerabilities was 'Weak correlation', and the
contribution of the number of ships to determine security vulnerabilities was 9.88%.

6.3.3. Correlation between Total Tonnage scale and cybersecurity
Vulnerabilities
When judging the size of the company's management vessels, it is difficult to rely
simply on the number of ships. This is because it cannot be said that a company that
manages ten ships with 500 Gross tons is larger than a company that manages two
ships with 100,000 Gross tons. So here, the correlation between the companies'
security vulnerabilities and the total Gross tonnage of all vessels managed by the
company is analyzed.
Figure 16. Correlation between ship’s tonnage and vulnerabilities
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The X-axis represents the sum of the total GT of all vessels held by a company, and
the Y-axis represents the company's security vulnerability value calculated in Chapter
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6.2. The correlation between the total tonnage of the vessel and the security
vulnerability resulted in a determination coefficient R2 = 0.1607 and a Pearson
correlation coefficient R = 0.4009. According to Table 5, the total tonnage of managed
vessels and the company's security vulnerability relationship have a 'Moderate
correlation' relationship. The contribution of total GT for company’s cybersecurity
vulnerabilities is about 16.1%.

6.3.4. Correlation between company’s cybersecurity capabilities
and cybersecurity vulnerabilities
Chapter 6.1.4 identifies the company's cybersecurity response capabilities in three
areas: organization & human resources, employee expertise, education & training.
Here it will be revealed how each company's cybersecurity response capabilities
correspond to the company's cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

Figure 17. Correlation between company factor and vulnerabilities
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The X-axis is a minimum of 1 point and a maximum of 5 points for the company's
cybersecurity response capability in three areas: organization & human resource,
workforce, expertise, education & training. The Y-axis is the value of a company's
cybersecurity vulnerability calculated in paragraph 6.2. This scatterplot was also
shown as R2 = 0.4115 on the trend line and calculated as the Pearson correlation
coefficient R =0.641483. According to Table 5, the correlation between the company's
cybersecurity response capabilities and the company's cybersecurity vulnerabilities is
a 'Moderate correlation,' with 41.15% contributing to the company's cybersecurity
vulnerability values.
In addition, the relationship between each of the three elements of the companies'
cybersecurity response capabilities and the company's cybersecurity vulnerabilities
can be found in Table 14. Of the three company capabilities items, organizations &
personnel had the highest relevance to the company's cybersecurity vulnerabilities,
and education & training had the lowest relevance. However, it can be seen that the
company's overall capability, which combines the three components, has the greatest
relevance to the company's security vulnerabilities.
Table 14. Correlation values of company factors

organizational
& human
resources

expertise

Education &
training

Total

R2

0.3095

0.2666

0.226

0.4115

R

0.556327

0.516333

0.475395

0.641483

Level of
correlation

Moderate
correlation

Moderate
correlation

Moderate
correlation

Moderate
correlation
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7. Discussion and Conclusion
7.1. Discussion of Findings
In this chapter, we will discuss the characteristics of the cybersecurity of Korean
shipping companies discovered through the analysis of Chapter 6 and discuss
possible improvement measures.

The overall score for cybersecurity vulnerabilities of Korean shipping companies was
3.47, which was found to be relatively reliable. According to the vulnerability rating
table in Table 4, 3.47 points belong to the Invulnerable section. In a survey of
companies' general status, most companies were aware of IMO resolution 428, and
about 87% of respondents said they had established a ship cybersecurity
management procedure at the company level. Nevertheless, companies with an
average ship’s size of less than 10,000 GT showed relative vulnerability with an
overall score of 2.9 points. Therefore, it seems desirable to focus mainly on small
companies for IMO or national-level efforts in response to future cybersecurity threats
Among the three areas of cybersecurity elements, the vulnerability of the
administrative security part got the highest score with 3.65 points, and the vulnerability
of the physical security part was the lowest with 3.27 points. The high score in the
administrative security part is believed to be due to the completion of the
establishment of management procedures for the cybersecurity of ships in most
companies and the maintenance of policy support. On the other hand, in some cases,
the physical security part requires changes in the ship's facilities or structure, so it
seems that companies have not taken active action yet. However, measures such as
removing S/W licenses (P7) or user information (P8) of equipment discarded or
storing (P9) in drawers with key security documents after use (P9) may be
implemented at no additional cost.

Of the 27 cybersecurity elements, Vulnerable or Very Vulnerabe rating in Table 4(the
vulnerability rating table) is only one element(P8). However, in the case of small
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shipping companies, the following six elements were found to be vulnerable or very
vulnerable rating.


T4: Data encryption is taking place through the use of virtual private networks
(VPNs) to connect to onboard networks (low risk).



T8: Protection is being provided for e-mail and web browsers with wired and
wireless access to ships' computers (medium risk).



P4: Data encryption is taking place through the use of virtual private networks
(VPNs) to connect to onboard networks (low risk).



P5: Procedures are being implemented to protect power and communication
cables that support data transmission and information (low risk).



P8: Procedures for verifying the protection and management of users'
information on unused equipment are being implemented (low risk).



P9: A policy of desk-cleaning for papers, portable storage media is being
implemented (medium risk).

T4, P4, P5, and P9 belong to the low-risk domain at the risk level in Figure 2, so even
if the company's cybersecurity management system is somewhat weak, it may not be
a big threat in terms of the overall aspect. However, the risks of T8 and P9 can pose
a practical threat to cybersecurity management because they belong to medium risk
with high probability and severity. Therefore, the government or related organizations,
such as Class, need first to guide companies to strengthen these two elements.

As a result of analyzing the correlation between the company's cybersecurity
vulnerability and the company's four characteristics (cybersecurity manpower,
number of ships, total tonnage of ships, and company’s cybersecurity capabilities),
manpower and ship’s number showed the Weak Correlation, and total tonnage and
the company's capability showed the Moderate Correlation according to Table 5. In
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particular, the company's cybersecurity capabilities had the greatest correlation with
vulnerability. Therefore, in order to improve the company's cybersecurity vulnerability,
it is desirable to improve the company's capabilities related to cybersecurity rather
than simply increasing the number of cybersecurity managers.

The company's cybersecurity capabilities are divided into three areas: organization &
human resources, employee expertise, education & training, of which organization &
human resources had the greatest correlation with vulnerability. However, organically
combining three items rather than individual items had a more significant correlation
with vulnerability. Therefore, the enhancement of the company's cybersecurity
capabilities needs to be comprehensively improved across all fields, such as
organization, expertise, and education, rather than focusing on any one field.

7.2. Conclusion
In Chapter 4, it was confirmed that cyber threats are rapidly increasing due to the
development of technology following the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the
strengthening of the connectivity between informatization devices. In addition,
Chapter 5 predicts that cybercrime is frequently occurring in the maritime industry,
which has been a safety zone for cyber threats so far, and that cyber threats will be
the biggest issue in the next decade with the introduction of advanced ICT
technologies such as e-Navigation and Autonomous ships

Related organizations such as BIMCO, Oil Majors, and Bulk Shipper Associations,
led by IMO, have been making efforts to publish cybersecurity guidelines, integrate
cybersecurity regulations into ships' SMS, and include cybersecurity elements in
shipper inspections’ items for oil tankers and bulk ships.

This paper analyzed how the efforts of these related agencies are being implemented
in the field of the shipping industry through the evaluation of the cybersecurity
vulnerability of shipping companies. In addition, in order to find ways to strengthen
cybersecurity vulnerabilities, it was analyzed how the vulnerability of shipping
companies correlates with various company characteristics.
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The first research question in Chapter 1.3 concerns the implementation of
cybersecurity elements of shipping companies. In Chapter 6.2, it was analyzed that
Korean shipping companies are relatively well implementing important cybersecurity
elements of cybersecurity guidelines issued by BIMCO and others. On the other hand,
it was confirmed that the deviation of cybersecurity vulnerabilities between individual
companies was large, and the security vulnerability of the small company group was
2.9 points, which was considerably lower than that of the large company group 3.69
points.

Regarding the second research question, Chapter 6.3 analyzed the correlation
between cybersecurity vulnerabilities and company characteristics. Here, it was
confirmed that the company's cybersecurity capabilities had the greatest correlation
with vulnerabilities, and the number of cybersecurity managers or management ships
had a relatively low correlation with cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
Regarding the third research question about IMO and States’ strategies to improve
cybersecurity vulnerabilities, based on the results of the discussion in Chapter 7.1 and
the results of the previous two research questions, it is judged that the following
suggestions are possible.

First, it is necessary to clarify the target of the policy. As can be seen from the analysis
in Chapter 6.3, It is common for the vulnerability of the entire group to differ greatly
between individual companies or specific groups. Small shipping companies are more
likely to be vulnerable than large shipping companies, and companies that manage
general cargo ships lines are more likely to be vulnerable than companies that
manage oil tankers or bulk carriers which are inspected by the shipper associations.
In addition, Domestic shipping companies are more likely to be vulnerable than
international shipping companies. Therefore, in order to effectively utilize the limited
resources of the government or international organizations, it is desirable to focus on
more vulnerable areas and promote policies to improve cybersecurity vulnerability.
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Second, it is necessary to clarify and simplify cybersecurity elements that companies
must comply with. The contents of the security guidelines published by BIMCO or
ISO/IEC are vast and professional, making it difficult for ordinary employees to
understand. Most shipping companies, regardless of the size of the company,
received low vulnerability scores in P8 item on user information protection of unused
equipment and P9 item to store critical data used in on board offices in drawers with
locked devices. This is believed to be due to companies' poor identification of these
two items hidden in the vast cybersecurity guidelines because it is not so difficult to
implement these items. Therefore, making cybersecurity elements that companies
must comply with simple and straightforward can increase the level of cybersecurity
response of companies.

Third, cybersecurity should be considered from the time the ship is designed. Among
cybersecurity elements, T4 (2.87 points), P4 (2.94 points), and P5 (2.75 points), which
require facility or structure changes, received lower scores than average (3.47 points),
but It takes a lot of time and money to improve these items. Therefore, there is a
problem that it cannot be easily improved after the ship is built. Moreover, if enavigation or automatic ships increase in the future, direct cybersecurity threats to
ships will increase significantly. Therefore, it is desirable to add cybersecurity
regulations to IMO's shipbuilding standards from now on.

Finally, the increase in cyber pirates and terrorism using ships can have a much more
serious impact than we expect. As the application of ICT technology to ships and the
universal use of the Internet using satellites become more common, cyber threats to
ships will increase day by day. Therefore, it is time for interested organizations such
as IMO, each member state, and BIMCO to once again check the effects of current
cybersecurity response policies and come up with more effective strategies.
Moreover, cybersecurity response at the global level is a goal that cannot be achieved
by the shipping companies or one country level. Therefore, international cooperation
and efforts centered on IMO should continue to strengthen cybersecurity.
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7.3. Limitations
In order to accurately grasp the cybersecurity response situation of the maritime
industry around the world, it is desirable to investigate various countries such as
developing countries, developed countries, shippers’ countries, and shipowners’
countries.

In addition, the cybersecurity elements used in this paper are mainly intended to
confirm the status of the operational elements of cybersecurity in terms of managing
ships. However, cyberattacks use a variety of routes connected to the target.
Therefore, in order to substantially secure the cybersecurity of the ship, the security
status of various targets connected to the ship must be analyzed. In other words, it is
necessary to review cybersecurity vulnerabilities across the maritime industry,
including port and terminal operating companies, shipping companies' land
departments, shipping agencies, quarantine stations, customs, VTSs, and shippers.

However, as explained in Chapter 1.4 of the study, the scope of this paper was limited
to analyzing the compliance of Korean shipping companies with ship cybersecurity
elements and the correlation between the company's characteristics and
cybersecurity vulnerabilities due to time and data constraints. Moreover, it is true that
the average analysis results were evaluated somewhat higher than the actual
situation due to the very low response rate of small ship companies that are presumed
to be poor in the operation of cybersecurity in the survey of shipping companies.
Nevertheless, this paper will be meaningful in that it is possible to understand how
cybersecurity guidelines developed by BIMCO are being implemented in the field.
Moreover, it is believed that analyzing how vulnerabilities derived from cybersecurity
operations correlate with the various characteristics of the company could serve as a
guide for IMO or member states to establish cybersecurity-related policies in the
future.
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Appendix 1
Questionnaires Survey for the vulnerability assessment of Korean shipping companies to
cyber threats

Dear Participant,
This survey is design to assess the vulnerability of shipping companies to
cyber threats. It is being conducted purely for academic research as part of my
Master’s Degree dissertation at the World Maritime University (WMU). It is not
part of any privately or publicly funded project.
It will take about 40 minutes in providing responses to all the questions. It may
also appear a bit tedious but please bear with me in completing the
questionnaires.
If you have any questions, comments or suggestions about this survey, please
feel free to contact me at w2005158@wmu.se or WhatsApp at number
(+46)728337110.
Thank you very much for taking time to fill-in the questionnaires.
Yours sincerely.
Sungjae Kim
Student, Master of Science in Maritime Safety & Environmental Administration
of World Maritime University, Malmo, Sweden
1. Personal particulars
Please answer the questions below about your personal information. Your
personal information is being sought solely for purposes of record and
validation of data, and will not be disclosed in any form
Questions

Answers

1-1. Name of participant
1-2. Name of Company
(1) Ship
owner
(2)
ship
management company (3)
others (
)

1-3 Kind of Company
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1-4. Your
Company

responsibilities

in

the

1-5. Email address/telephone number

2. General
Please answer the general question of your company. For multiple choice
questions, you can choose the appropriate one out of the six answers.
Questions

Answers

2-1. Number of ships managed by your
company
In the following table, please indicate the size distribution of the ships managed by
your company
Ship’s size
(Gross
Tonnage)

Less than
100 GT

100 GT or
more
~
Less
than
500 GT

500 GT or
more
~
Less
than
1000 GT

1000 GT or
more
~
Less
than
5000 GT

5000 GT
or more
~
Less than
10000 GT

10000
GT
or
more

number
of ships
2-2. Did you know that the IMO Maritime
Safety Commttee's Resolution on Marine
Cyber Risk Management (IMO (2017.6),
Yes/No/Not applicable
Resolution MSC.428 (98)) were implemented
in January 2021?
2-3. Does your company incorporate cyber risk
management regulations into its SMS
Yes/No/Not applicable
according to the recommendations of the?
2-4. Does your company establish and
implement procedures to prevent cyberattacks
and crimes against ships?
Yes/No/Not applicable
* If you answered question 2–3 with yes, omit
the answer.
2-5. Why does your company establish and
(1) PSC (2) Shipper’s request (3)
implement cyberattacks (crime) prevention
cybercrime prevent (4) compliance
(response) procedures against ships?
with IMO or flag state
* Answer questions when 2-3 or 2-4 answers
recommendations (5) other(
)
are Yes (multiple responses available)
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2-6. Number of ship security managers in the
company
2-7. Are your company's security managers
exposed to work other than directly or
indirectly related to ship security. If so, how
many percent of their work do security
managers use for work that is not related to
ship security?
2-8. Does your company have enough
organization or manpower for ship security
management?

Yes/No
%

(1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree
(3) Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly
agree (0) Not applicable

(1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree
2-9. Does your ship security managers have
(3) Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly
expertise in security work?
agree (0) Not applicable
2-10. Are your security managers properly and
periodically trained to improve ship security
management?
2-11. What should your company first
strengthen for effective ship security
management
(professionals,
training,
equipment, government support, etc.).
2-12. Are there any external experts (or
special company) contracted to perform your
company's ship security management?
2-13. Do you think external experts (or special
company) are doing enough for ship security
management?
(Answer only if the answer in 2-12. is yes)
2-14. What are the top priorities for external
experts (or special company) to play an
effective role (such as replacing experts,
increasing staff, increasing contract amounts,
etc.).
(Answer only if the answer in 2-12. is yes)

(1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree
(3) Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly
agree (0) Not applicable

Yes / No
(1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree
(3) Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly
agree (0) Not applicable

3. Ships Cybersecurity Management
Please answer questions about three areas (administrative, technical and
Physical security) to investigate the current level of ship security
management in your company.
These questions used data from a study on Strengthening Cyber-security
System in the Maritime Sector (Korea Maritime Institute, 2019).
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.3-1. Administrative Security
Questions

Answers

3-1-1. There is control over the mobile (1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
media (USB, mobile PCs, etc.) used in Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
ships.
Not applicable
3-1-2. Periodic upgrades and ongoing (1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
maintenance of H/W and S/W of ship Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
computers* are performed.
Not applicable
3-1-3. Trainings for ship and land staff are (1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
provided periodically to raise awareness on Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
information protection.
Not applicable
(1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
3-1-4. Anti-virus and anti-malware S/W
Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
tools supplied for ship computers.
Not applicable
3-1-5. The policy of controlling remote (1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
access to ship computers is being Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
implemented.
Not applicable
3-1-6. Restricting access to ships (port (1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
officials, technicians, agents, etc) is being Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
implemented.
Not applicable
(1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
3-1-7. Access to sensitive information is
Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
granted only to authorized employees.
Not applicable
(1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
3-1-8. Emergency plans are in place for
Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
cyberattacks.
Not applicable
(1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
3-1-9.
Equipment disposal policies,
Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
including data, are being implemented.
Not applicable
* ship computers mean all personal, business, and equipment control and
operation computers (including those built into the equipment).
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3-2. Technical Security
Questions

Answers

3-2-1. Anti-malware software is installed on (1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
ships' computers, and periodic patch file Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
updates are made.
Not applicable
3-2-2. Remote access control is performed (1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
on a ship's networks and computers using Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
an encryption key.
Not applicable
3-2-3. Network ports, protocols, and (1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
services of ship’s networks and computers Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
are restricted and controlled.
Not applicable
3-2-4. Protection is being provided for e- (1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
mail and web browsers with wired and Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
wireless access to ships' computers..
Not applicable
3-2-5. Network devices such as firewalls, (1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
routers, and switches are configured to Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
protect networks and computers on board. Not applicable
3-2-6. Security configurations of hardware
(1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
and software (restrictions on access to
Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
systems outside of control) are being
Not applicable
implemented.
3-2-7. Cyberattacks detection, prevention,
(1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
and warning are being made through the
Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
system for on-board networks and
Not applicable
computers.
3-2-8. Support for data backup and
recovery is provided for onboard
computers.

(1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
Not applicable

3-2-9. Data encryption is taking place (1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
through the use of virtual private networks Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
(VPNs) to connect to on-board networks.
Not applicable
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3-3. Physical Security
Questions

Answers

3-3-1. Physical security zones and access (1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
control are in place for important facilities on Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
board.
Not applicable
3-3-2. Equipment, information and software (1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
are prohibited from being taken out without Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
prior approval.
Not applicable
3-3-3. Procedures are being implemented
(1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
to remove and verify data and license S/W
Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
in the event of reuse and disposal of
Not applicable
equipment, including storage media.
3-3-4. Control of unauthorized user access (1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
and isolation procedures for information Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
system are being implemented
Not applicable
3-3-5. A policy of desk-cleaning for papers, (1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
portable
storage
media
is
being Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
implemented.
Not applicable
3-3-6. Physical security design and (1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
application to the ship's offices, workspaces Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
and critical facilities are being implemented. Not applicable
3-3-7. Procedures are being implemented
to ensure continuous availability and
confidentiality of equipment from the
shutdown of ship’s electric power and
support facilities.
3-3-8. Procedures for verifying the
protection and management of users'
information on unused equipment are being
implemented.

(1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
Not applicable
(1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
Not applicable

3-3-9. Procedures are being implemented
(1) Strongly disagree (2) disagree (3)
to protect power and communication cables
Neutral (4) Agree (5) Strongly agree (0)
that support data transmission and
Not applicable
information facilities.
I would appreciate it if you could submit the completed questionnaire to
w2005158@wmu.se
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